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Caucasus has become a region of direct concern to the EU’s strategy in its wider
neighbourhood. This article examines the trends affecting EU policies in the South
Caucasus, with a specific focus on EU–Azerbaijan relations. It argues that in the three
main areas in which Azerbaijan affects Europe’s interests – cooperation in the energy
sector, democratization and conflict resolution – so far the EU has engaged well on a
regional energy strategy; but less so on democratic reforms, and almost not at all on
conflict settlement in Nagorno Karabakh.
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Introduction1
In the post-9/11 era, the concept of European integration has gained new momentum in the
three aspiring democracies of the South Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Discussions are underway in South Caucasian societies about the essential political and
economic conditions for closer integration with the EU. A very intense debate focuses on
the role the EU can assume in territorial conflicts compared with other international security
organizations, and how the EU can foster regional cooperation through aid programmes.
Other issues include complementarities and collaboration between the EU and other inter-
national organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as well as expectations and responses related to the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), including the matter of regional unity in the South
Caucasus.
Obviously, external influences and renewed rivalries have affected the foreign policy
orientations and security perceptions of the three South Caucasian countries. The impor-
tance of the EU relations differs significantly in each republic, leading to diverging stances
on official EU integration strategies. While Georgia is endeavouring to move closer to the
EU, Azerbaijan is giving priority to a phased approach and Armenia currently does not view
EU membership as a vital element of its foreign policy. The South Caucasian states have
not yet become concrete candidates for EU membership, nor do they seem to have such
prospects in the foreseeable future.
Even so, the EU continues to develop closer political and economic ties with them by
means of the ENP. The inclusion of these states in the ENP in 2004 signalled the EU’s
geopolitical interests in this part of the world, although more specific and practical policies
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are needed. Oil-rich Azerbaijan deserves special consideration, as a pivotal country with the
largest population in the region. Today this Muslim state has close contacts with the Islamic
world, while it is simultaneously influenced by neighbouring Christian countries oriented
towards Western culture. Its position on the junction of the West and East has enabled
Azerbaijan to develop a synthesis of the values of both cultures.
How does the EU define its interests in Azerbaijan in economic, political and security
terms? How does Azerbaijani society perceive the ENP? What factors continue to affect the
EU’s ability to play a more active role in the region? And finally, how could the EU
contribute to modernization and democratization in Azerbaijan? Although this study
focuses more specifically on EU–Azerbaijan relations, it generally examines the strategic
trends affecting EU policies in the South Caucasus. The article also looks at new elements
in the EU’s strategy and explores some of the dilemmas and security challenges in the
conflict-ridden region.
ENP in the regional context
The incorporation of the South Caucasian countries into the ENP is viewed positively,
generating hope for a larger EU role in the region. This move sent an important message
that the EU is committed to supporting the three states on their way towards democratiza-
tion and creating viable market economies. In response, these countries consider the ENP a
solid opportunity for further EU integration. But it would be mistaken to assume that the
EU’s policy has changed substantially. The EU still lacks a clear institutional force driving
the formulation of a strategic vision for the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, the South
Caucasus is a significant component of EU foreign policy. As discussed below, the devel-
opment and implementation of the ENP is important to both sides: the EU will gain more
influence through the ENP, which in turn will enable the three small states to forge closer
ties with the EU.
EU strategy and profile of interests
The EU has some stakes in this volatile region, particularly in terms of energy and security.
Regional challenges include extremism, separatism and terrorism as well as territorial
disputes, a regional arms race, environmental concerns and the rise of transnational orga-
nized crime. The virtually isolated conflict zones – such as Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, where there is no official international presence – have been directly
implicated in transnational crime.2 Moreover, the unresolved conflicts risk renewed
hostilities and new migration flows, thus posing threat to human rights across the South
Caucasus. In this context, any kind of regional destabilization may seriously affect security
in the EU’s wider neighbourhood.
On the other hand, there are opportunities related to the energy deposits of the Caspian
Sea and the role of the South Caucasus as both a resource-rich area and a transit corridor for
carrying petroleum and gas to Europe, counterweighing dependence on Persian Gulf oil and
Russian gas supplies. EU member states have increasing economic interests in the region –
a potentially lucrative and attractive place for foreign direct investment (FDI), especially for
multinational oil companies. Therefore, conflict resolution should be regarded as a prereq-
uisite for securing energy export routes. Internal political stability is another precondition
for the development of energy and infrastructure projects, both of which are vital for the region.
Unsurprisingly, the inclusion of the South Caucasian countries in the ENP points to
increased EU visibility and engagement in this post-Soviet territory. The ENP also offers a
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marvellous opportunity for these states to develop their interregional relations. As yet, much
depends on the ability of the South Caucasian societies to transform the ENP from a mere
concept into an effective model of cooperation. But the main questions are whether the ENP
will substantially advance the relations between these states and the EU and whether the EU
should apply individual or regional approaches towards the three countries. The EU seems
to provide them with equal opportunities, and Brussels is watching how they manage to
exploit these chances.
Lately, the inequality in the three Caucasian countries’ preparedness to cooperate more
fully with Euro-Atlantic structures has impeded efforts to resolve regional security issues.
While the ruling elites have declared their commitment to a closer alliance with the EU, they
do not seem to invest sufficient effort towards reaching that goal. At the same time, the
absence of a consistent EU strategy for the South Caucasus, along with the lack of resources
and active coordination with other international organizations for resolving regional
conflicts, has led to some perceived ambiguity on the part of the EU in this respect. Still,
the three countries have often reaffirmed their general EU orientations and each has built its
own bridge to Europe, with Azerbaijan exploiting its energy resources, Georgia making use
of its traditional Western-oriented elite and Armenia bringing its wealthy diaspora into play.
Geopolitical determinants of Azerbaijan’s foreign and security policy
Recognition of being an integral part of a wider and closely interlinked Black Sea–Caspian
region has enabled the Azerbaijani ruling elite to pursue a balanced interest-based policy in
foreign relations with major regional powers. Azerbaijan enjoys warm relations with
Russia, Turkey, Iran, the United States (US) and the EU, thus trying to satisfy the interests
of all nearest and distant powerful actors. From a geopolitical standpoint, only through such
a balanced diplomatic stance has Azerbaijan been able to guarantee national security and
good economic prospects. This small Caucasian state has always been able to play a more
independent role because of Caspian energy riches and a very experienced political leader-
ship (Nuriyev 2007b). But Russia and Iran still regard Azerbaijan’s endeavours to expand
cooperation with Euro-Atlantic structures as a potent challenge. In recent years the
Azerbaijani–Iranian dispute over the division of the Caspian Sea has already caused several
complicated situations in which Iran has violated Azerbaijani territorial waters and
airspace.3 Iran’s aggressive stance against Azerbaijan has solidified Azerbaijani–Turkish
relations, thus linking Baky and Ankara even closer.
Nevertheless, Azerbaijani leadership wants to foster better relations with Iran while
maintaining strong strategic partnership with the US. Striking the proper diplomatic
balance is proving tricky for Baky, given the long-standing animosity that exists between
Washington and Tehran. Since the US position toward Iran is hardening, Azerbaijani
authorities realize that they must tread carefully as they seek to improve ties between Baky
and Tehran. For this reason, balancing Azerbaijani interests between the US and Iran will
be a major test for the country’s ruling elite, since it is going to be difficult to abstain from
US policy towards Iran.
On the other hand, Azerbaijan is looking towards Russia for support in its regional inter-
ests, as President Ilham Aliyev tries to strengthen already warm ties between the two coun-
tries. In recent years Azerbaijani–Russian relations have considerably improved and led to
increased economic transactions, including a bilateral deal on the delimitation of the
Caspian Sea and an agreement on the Qabala radar station (Margelov 2002). Therefore,
Baky’s tactics seem dedicated to addressing Moscow’s immediate strategic interests. More
exactly, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have presently been brought to a new
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strategic level. Both Azerbaijan and Russia recognize each other as important neighbours
and strategic partners. The two countries are bound by commercial and economic ties, and
from this perspective the friendly relations that exist between Azerbaijan and Russia can
only be strengthened.
For Azerbaijan, national interests have indeed begun to take on a more pronounced
role in the country’s strategy for developing bilateral and multilateral ties. Azerbaijan’s
strong support of the anti-terrorism campaign has significantly extended security ties with
the US, mainly deepening American strategic interests in the entire region. The strength-
ening of US–Azerbaijani security relations has also cleared the way for wide-ranging
cooperation with other Western democracies, most notably the EU member states such as
Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy. Azerbaijan’s participation in the transnational
energy projects is aimed at protecting its strategic interests in the wider Black Sea–
Caspian basin area and moving forward in accomplishing measures for closer integration
into the European community. Today, the EU seeks alternative energy supplies that could
satisfy its growing consumption. More precisely, the EU strongly supports the multiplicity
of both suppliers and transport pipelines as a means of diversifying its supply of energy
resources and lowering energy prices. Accordingly, the EU seeks to enhance its relations
with Central Asian states in order to establish a long energy corridor that could bring
Eastern Caspian hydrocarbon resources to Western Europe via Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Turkey and Southeastern Europe.
Azerbaijan at the core of international relations
Azerbaijan has become one of the most frequently discussed countries in international
circles. Since independence, the international community has been instrumental in helping
to solve problems that are important to the Azerbaijani population. In recent years, major
international donors in Azerbaijan have implemented various programmes aimed at
cultivating a democratic society and an open market. Likewise, Azerbaijan receives solid
political support from most of the world and international organizations, as it endeavours to
restore territorial integrity and consolidate national sovereignty.
Indeed, Azerbaijan is growing closer to the Western world for the three major reasons
that make this Caucasian state a special case. These are Azerbaijan’s energy resources, the
contribution of a settlement over Nagorno-Karabakh to regional stability and the country’s
democratization through profound modernization. It is the combination of these issues that
has placed Azerbaijan at the core of international relations.
Azerbaijan – Caspian keystone of the wider Black Sea region
The wider Black Sea–Caspian basin area is increasingly becoming a place of utmost impor-
tance in terms of energy production, transportation and distribution. The entire region finds
itself on the crossroads of transportation corridors to connect Europe with the South
Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. From an economic viewpoint, the wider Black
Sea–Caspian basin is one of the fastest growing regions globally. In this context, the South
Caucasus–Caspian basin offers enormous strategic benefits to member states of the EU.
This strategically vital region is not only energy-rich, but also links Central Asia with
Europe. Most importantly, Azerbaijan serves as a hub connecting energy and transportation
infrastructure between Asia and Europe. The entire region has the huge potential to become
a gateway between the Balkans and the South Caucasus, linking Romania to Georgia, and,
via energy-rich Azerbaijan, to the Caspian Sea basin.
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Azerbaijan’s perceived willingness to cooperate closely with the enlarged Euro-Atlantic
alliance has attracted an unprecedented level of international attention to the country. The
country’s energy wealth constitutes an important counterweight to the volatile Persian Gulf
for Western democracies, which will help Europe to diversify its energy imports. Currently,
Azerbaijan uses the possibilities to export oil and gas via the Baky–Supsa oil pipeline to
Georgia, the Baky–Novorossiysk oil pipeline to Russia, via the main export oil pipeline
Baky–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) to Georgia, Turkey and the world market and the Baky–
Tbilisi–Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline to Georgia and Turkey, where it connects to the
Turkish gas network through which Azerbaijan can deliver natural gas all over Europe.
Besides, there is a gas pipeline to Russia (Hajikabul–Mosdok), through which Azerbaijan
imported Russian gas until its production became self-sufficient.4 Azerbaijan also exports
gas to Europe via the Turkish–Greek pipeline. The Turkish–Greek pipeline was filled with
Azerbaijani gas through the BTE pipeline for the first time in July 2007, and it is planned
that the pipeline will be extended to Italy until 2012.
In fact, the newly inaugurated BTC and BTE pipelines, built mainly to relieve the
Western world’s oil and gas dependency on the Middle East, underscore Azerbaijan’s
geopolitical importance for the European market. This development also gives the country
more control over its own destiny by providing strategic alternatives to Russia. As an energy
supplier, in 2006 Azerbaijan was already exporting some 1.2 million tons of crude oil to
Europe via the Russian port of Novorossiysk. In addition, some 10 million tons of
Azerbaijani oil were transported to Europe in 2006 via the BTC route. By early April 2007,
the BTC project had pumped approximately 14 million tons of crude to the Mediterranean.
As time goes by, the BTC pipeline is set to increase the mutual interdependence of the EU
and Azerbaijan dramatically. The pipeline has a projected lifespan of 40 years. Currently
working at normal capacity, the BTC pipeline is already capable of exporting maximum 50
million tons of oil per year to the European market.5
Obviously, Azerbaijan’s natural gas production from the Shah Deniz field will rise
sharply in the next few years, the scale of which is expected not only to make the country
self-supporting in natural gas, but also to result in substantial export revenues and position
the country as a major gas exporter from the Caspian basin. According to local media
reports, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) is planned to produce 8
billion cubic meters of natural gas from the Shah Deniz field in 2008. It was also announced
that the annual production will make up 20–22 billion cubic meters in 2020. The Shah Deniz
field, with its huge gas reserves, is the most important field not only in Azerbaijan but also
in the world. By recent estimates, the reserves of the field top 1.2 trillion cubic meters of
gas.6
Interestingly, resource-rich Azerbaijan forms a transit hub in an evolving geo-strategic
and geo-economic system that stretches from Europe to the South Caucasus and Central
Asia. The country provides another route for transporting Caspian energy supplies to
European member states, some of which are increasingly dependent on Russian gas. Most
notably, Germany and France are reliant on Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned monopolistic
company. Given that the majority of European countries’ natural gas demand is expected to
burgeon in the near future, the prospective alternative could be a trans-Caspian pipeline
carrying natural gas to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and then to Central Europe. Despite the
new energy deal signed on 12 May 2007 between Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan for
a rival Caspian gas pipeline, Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov
specifically indicated that the trans-Caspian pipeline project had not been cancelled.
Moreover, the recent announcement on the possible joint exploration of an offshore Caspian
Sea field, named Kapaz by Azerbaijan and Serdar by Turkmenistan, and the two countries’
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willingness to investigate the proposed export option keep construction plans alive. Both the
EU and the US have used the promising rapprochement to resume lobbying for the trans-
Caspian gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, seeing it as a vital energy link
to the European market.7 Perhaps, the special case of the shared, offshore Caspian field is
the most plausible source of gas for Azerbaijan to transit; but it largely depends on a
demarcation agreement, which so far has not been signed between the Caspian littoral
states.
The challenge of a ‘frozen conflict’: the case of Nagorno-Karabakh
Restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and return of the internally displaced
people (IDP) to their homeland remain a chief priority in the foreign policy of the country.
The lack of resolution of the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict prevents security cooperation
and impedes economic development across the region. The current situation of no war, yet
no peace in the conflict zone plays a crucial role in Azerbaijan’s political instability. In
recent years Azerbaijan has tried its utmost to use every opportunity to move the negotiation
process forward in the peace talks on the conflict settlement. The negotiations have been
held at the level of presidents and ministers of foreign affairs in the framework of the so-
called Prague process. New summits are scheduled for the Armenian and Azerbaijani
presidents, who have yet to discuss the pivotal issues for resolving the conflict. This means
that the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh8 has yet to be determined.
At the same time, diplomatic efforts continue to further consolidate the position of inter-
national community based on support of territorial integrity and the inviolability of
Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders, as well as condemnation of the occupation
and ethnic cleansing. EU, OSCE, Council of Europe (CoE) and principal powers declared
the so-called presidential and municipal elections in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region
of Azerbaijan illegal and with no legal effect. In turn, this proves that the international
community expresses support and respect for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and demon-
strates that international organizations and leading nations send a clear signal to those
destructive forces who try to attempt to lead the peace process into a deadlock and accept
the occupation of Azerbaijani lands as a fait accompli.
Indeed, the lack of progress in finding an enduring solution to this protracted ‘frozen’
territorial conflict is a worrying and destabilizing factor that continues to impact upon wider
European security and calls for far greater efforts by the European security organizations.
Certainly, much will also depend on how successfully EU institutions develop multilateral
cooperation with the OSCE and the CoE and create new possibilities for intensifying
constructive dialogue.
Promoting democratization through profound modernization
The development of democracy, good governance and an open society is an additional prob-
lem that Azerbaijan has been facing since regaining independence in 1991. Azerbaijanis are
proud that they established the first democracy in the Muslim world as far back as 1918.9
Modern Azerbaijan is a proving ground where tools and models for breaking old stereotypes
and establishing new democratic values are being tested. This secular Muslim country aspires
to build democratic institutions and create a market economy. Azerbaijani authorities
strongly believe that the main task faced by the ruling elite during recent years has been the
formation of a new political space of the country where citizens would realize their own rights
and obligations.10 Currently, Azerbaijani leadership is formulating a new comprehensive
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strategy, aimed at bringing about drastic political change and extensive economic modern-
ization of the society. Much of the work is to be done by Azerbaijanis themselves, although
the international organizations should also come up with their part of the new agenda as the
major contributors to Azerbaijan’s future success. It is about a new vision of how to respond
to existing and future challenges in an ever-changing world. The restoration of territorial
integrity and the consolidation of national sovereignty are absolutely necessary to keep that
vision strong.
Notwithstanding some serious impediments, Azerbaijan can still attain a true democ-
racy, as Azerbaijani society is prone to evolutionary democratic change. Certainly, the EU
can add unique value in promoting the country’s democratic transition, but EU relations and
cooperation with Azerbaijan are partly going to be determined by the advances made by the
authorities in Baky towards political and economic transformation. Many in Baky know
well that even with its oil and gas riches, Azerbaijan will be unable to move closer to the
EU without a series of radical reforms, notably in law enforcement, industrial monopolies,
human rights and the judicial system. Success in developing democratic standards and a
market economy in Azerbaijan could serve as a model for diffusing similar reforms across
the post-Soviet Muslim states of Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – creating a new ‘corridor of democratic values’
that would add to the security and stability of Eurasia as the whole.
EU–Azerbaijan relations
Azerbaijan’s geographical location at the crossroads of Eurasia stimulates interest by the
EU, which offers Azerbaijan a broad spectrum of opportunities for progressive integration
into the European market. Azerbaijan places partnership and cooperation with the EU
among its principle foreign policy priorities. What follows below considers all-round
interaction between the two sides, mainly analysing the main advantages and obstacles
associated with closer relations.
EU–Azerbaijan cooperation and energy security
Major European companies have invested in Azerbaijan’s energy sector; several oil giants,
such as British Petroleum, Total Fina Elf and Statoil have signed partnership agreements
with the country, coinciding with the expanding presence of some EU member states. The
pipeline developments have helped reinforce the perception of Azerbaijan as a reliable
energy partner and bolstered its economic cooperation with Western democracies. In recent
years, Azerbaijan has received high levels of FDI and inflows of FDI into the petroleum
sector lead to favourable spillover effects on other sectors – but only if Azerbaijan can
manage monetary fluctuations linked with increases in oil export revenues.
Clearly, there is optimism regarding the future of Azerbaijan’s economy, despite its
extreme dependence on the oil sector for its long-term welfare. There are many reasons to
believe that Azerbaijan will join the ranks of Norway rather than Nigeria in terms of manag-
ing its oil wealth. The country’s access to international energy markets via the BTC and
BTE pipelines is unique. Even after projected falls in oil and gas income (probably between
2013 and 2015), Azerbaijan will continue to profit from pipeline transit revenues.
Azerbaijani authorities know well that their initiatives to prepare for mass inflows of oil
revenues could help them avoid the ‘Dutch disease’ and its related effects on the economy.
But the fact that the country is increasingly less reliant on foreign petroleum corporations
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans has raised concerns about whether the near
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future holds any strong incentives for economic reform. For this reason, a continued push
towards a market economy is essential, and the EU attaches much importance to the creation
of a liberal business climate in Azerbaijan. However, the ruling elite in Baky realizes that
continuing efforts to reform the economy and expand the non-oil sectors will help the
country to cope successfully with the next phase of economic transition.
Energy security is gaining prominence on the EU agenda and it is likely to guide the
EU’s relations with Azerbaijan in the coming years. More recently, European Commission
(EC) and Azerbaijani officials have begun talks on Azerbaijan’s involvement in energy
security projects supported by the EU.11 President Aliyev’s meetings in November 2006
with EC President Jose Manuel Barroso, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana, President of the European Parliament Josep Borrell
Fontelles, EU Commissioner for Energy Andris Piebalgs and other officials in Brussels
opened a new chapter in bilateral relations. The two sides signed a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MoU) in Brussels on 7 November 2006 on the strategic energy partnership
between the EU and Azerbaijan.12 In a recent interview, Mr. Solana underscored the impor-
tance of the energy accord, which will enhance Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the EU at the
strategic level.13
In the context of developing strategic partnership with the EU, the role of Azerbaijan in
ensuring global energy security has increased, while the authorities clearly manifested the
country’s direction towards the integration into the European transport system. Azerbaijan
has made its contribution to strengthening energy security on regional and global levels by
providing effective and safe transport corridors connecting Caspian and Mediterranean
basins and developing the trans-regional pipeline infrastructure. The materialization of the
Turkish–Greek gas pipeline in 2007 created additional opportunities for supplying
Azerbaijani gas to the European markets. Besides, in the framework of development of the
‘East–West’ transportation corridor in the Caspian basin, serious practical steps aimed at
fulfillment of the strategically important project of constructing Baky–Tbilisi–Kars railway
were taken in 2007.
Still, durable political stabilization in Azerbaijan is hampered by the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh, about which the EU has repeatedly expressed concern. In this regard,
the EU welcomes the dialogue between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the
regular meetings between the foreign ministers, hoping these negotiations will result in a
peace deal. Many in Azerbaijan are keen to see a larger EU role in resolving the conflict.
Compared with the OSCE and the CoE, the EU offers a unique combination of economic
power and possibilities for solid political dialogue, adding value to conventional multilat-
eral diplomacy under the OSCE’s aegis. After Swedish diplomat Peter Semneby became the
new EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus in February 2006, regional conflict
resolution was given higher EU priority. In an interview, Mr. Semneby emphasized that the
EU’s mandate had been expanded, thus signalling more active EU interest in seeking a
peaceful settlement. In this context, he revealed the EU’s concern about threats of renewed
hostilities in the conflict zone.14 Recently, frequent breaches of the ceasefire in Nagorno-
Karabakh have demonstrated the fragility and instability of the situation at the front, even
if there has been no return to full-scale hostilities.
Throughout 2006–2007, the EU Special Representative worked hard to take a direct part
in conflict resolution, although the EU has no formal role in the peace talks over Nagorno-
Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group. Under the recently altered EU
Special Representative mandate, Mr. Semneby is asked not to assist but to contribute
towards conflict settlement in the region. Perhaps most importantly, Mr. Semneby has
suggested that the EU could, in future, assume a peacekeeping mission if a solution to the
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conflict is found.15 Yet most politicians in Baky and Yerevan realize that a serious
breakthrough is needed in the negotiating process to make sustainable progress in finding a
mutually acceptable political settlement.
The ENP action plan for Azerbaijan
In March 2005, the EC recommended intensifying its relations with Azerbaijan through the
development of an individual Action Plan under the ENP,16 adopted in November 2006.17
In turn, Azerbaijan’s leadership has responded positively to the strategic vision the Action
Plan articulates, attaching importance to it as a tool for EU integration. Although the Action
Plan does not hold a membership prospect, it offers practical benefits to both sides on many
issues of shared interest and has given impetus to wide-ranging cooperation. As a political
document, it sets out mutual, concrete commitments, some of which will help contribute to
the further transformation of Azerbaijani society. The Action Plan creates a favourable
foundation for the further implementation of political and economic reforms. Despite
containing some generalizations, this new document could serve as a road map for accom-
plishing broader and effective changes in the country. Clearly, the very demanding task of
implementing the Action Plan will require Azerbaijan to undertake major efforts to attain
European political and economic standards.
Political stability and democratization are the two priority areas for Azerbaijan, and are
essential for the country to derive the full benefits from the Action Plan. Consequently,
implementation of the Action Plan will require Azerbaijani authorities to demonstrate that
their country entertains common values with the EU in practice. There is great potential for
the deepening of the strategic partnership, which Azerbaijan should exploit. In turn, the EU
seems ready to mobilize resources to support reforms, brought together under the new Euro-
pean Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The main goal of the ENPI is to
help Azerbaijan attain European standards in jointly agreed areas. It is already clear that EU
assistance will be conditional, however, as the delivery of financial aid is linked to tangible
results in the implementation of democratic reforms.
Oil-rich Azerbaijan: influence of the EU and other external actors
Recent years have seen growing prominence given to energy-rich Azerbaijan in the foreign
policies and national security plans of many outside powers. Major geopolitical players –
Russia, Iran, Turkey, the US and the EU – are vigorously competing to extend their
influence in the South Caucasus–Caspian basin. While Iran and Turkey are regional actors,
Russia and the US are seen as key contenders for advantage in the entire region. In turn, the
EU takes a more or less neutral stance, albeit individual EU member states have their own
geo-strategic interests in this post-Soviet territory.
Regional power rivalries: Iran and Turkey
Being significant players in the region, Iran and Turkey have a powerful impact on
Caucasian geopolitics and Caspian geo-economics. In the case of Azerbaijan, Iran and
Turkey are evidently concerned with what happens in this post-Soviet Muslim state. In real-
ity, Tehran realizes that Azerbaijani ties with Turkey, a NATO member state, will reduce
Iranian leverage in the region. For this reason, Iran sees Turkey as a major competitor
despite the fact that Tehran and Ankara have an important, if ambivalent, relationship. The
clerical regime feels that Turkey threatens Iran geopolitically, and these two regional
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powers are not simply in direct competition over influence but also represent a delicate set
of geopolitical alliances in the region. While Ankara is strongly backed by Washington,
Tehran and Moscow collaborate in the military and political realms in their attempt to resist
growing Turkish and American weight in the Caspian basin. Turkey has chosen Azerbaijan
as its strategic ally, and Iran, in turn, collaborates closely with Armenia, whose relations
with Turkey are hostile.
Unsurprisingly, Turkey’s relations with Iran have also experienced the effects of geopo-
litical competition. Both Ankara and Tehran have viewed the other’s attempts to gain a
political and economic footing in the South Caucasus with considerable suspicion. Iran has
always been concerned that a decrease of Russian predominance in the region would result
in an increase in Turkish advantage or in an expansion of American influence.18 In effect,
Tehran is still worried about Turkey’s efforts to forge close political, economic, cultural and
military ties with Azerbaijan. Ankara regards the possibility of greater Iranian clout in
Azerbaijan as an obstacle to its foreign policy efforts to pursue political and economic inter-
ests in the region. Though competition between Iran and Turkey over Azerbaijan has
become less intense since the early 1990s, geopolitical concerns continue to determine their
perceptions of each other’s regional behaviour.
Great-power politics: Russia and the United States
Paradoxically, the foundation for current American policy in post-Soviet Azerbaijan lies
firmly within the parameters of the new US–Russian strategic partnership in the post-9/11
environment. Nevertheless, as Russia reasserts its position in the face of a broadening US
presence in the South Caucasus and the Caspian basin, the entire region is emerging as an
arena of great-power competition between Moscow and Washington. Washington is trying
to prevent political and economic supremacy by any one rival power in oil-rich Azerbaijan.
For this reason, the US has a keen interest in maintaining the ‘geopolitical pluralism’ of the
region and preventing Russian ascendancy (Brzezinski 1997). Russia is powerless to inhibit
the spread of US influence in this post-Soviet territory. Still, Washington often reacts rather
cautiously to the increasing pressure that the Kremlin puts upon Azerbaijan, which is trying
to strike a geopolitical balance between the two great powers.
How Russia and the US act strategically in the South Caucasus will affect geopolitical
alignments throughout the post-Soviet territory. The common desire of these two principal
powers to combat global terrorism and cut off illegal trafficking is complicated by geo-stra-
tegic rivalry. Azerbaijan has found itself in a delicate position amidst incompatible political
options, since Moscow perceives growing US military engagement as a hostile expansion-
ism in Russia’s natural zone of influence. In practice, these strategic options remain some-
what linked to fluctuations in Russian–American relations. Therefore, the Azerbaijani
leadership has realized that closer cooperation with Russia over security matters is also
vital, even if some aspects of Kremlin policy are uncomfortable. Even so, the near future
seems to promise no way of establishing a common security system and embarking on inte-
gration processes in the South Caucasus. Unfortunately, the region has become a solid knot
of great-power contradictions that will take decades of effort to undo.
The EU’s neutral stance
The presence of important external actors has complicated EU strategic thinking on the
South Caucasus. In terms of foreign and security policy, the EU’s role in Azerbaijan is not
at all comparable with other principal powers such as Russia, the US, Iran and Turkey.
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Against these geopolitical players, the EU’s political engagement in Azerbaijan has been
minimal. In essence, the EU’s foreign policy towards Azerbaijan is dominated by consider-
ations of how European policies will affect EU–Russia relations. Additionally, the EU has
significant differences with the US regarding its strategic goals in the South Caucasus. The
EU does not intend to isolate either Russia or Iran from commercial opportunities in the
Caspian basin. In contrast, the EU has always tried to build positive relations with both of
these regional powers. Although the EU has no desire to become the key security actor in
this region, it seeks to promote a ring of well-governed and stable countries in Europe’s
southern tier, which perfectly suits Russian and American interests.
At the same time, the stabilization of Azerbaijan, which depends on an intensification of
EU support for conflict resolution, is crucial given the EU’s search for greater energy inde-
pendence. The signing of the energy accord between the EU and Azerbaijan in Brussels on
7 November 2006 enhances bilateral energy cooperation and promises to transport large
volumes of oil and gas to the European market. The EU is also keen to cooperate with
Azerbaijan on the problem of Iran. While the EU is trying to thwart Tehran’s ambitions to
build nuclear weapons, Azerbaijan is seeking political support for its efforts to improve the
standing of ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Iran. Undoubtedly, the increasing cooperation on
energy matters between Azerbaijan and the EU and the growing strategic partnership on
geopolitical concerns are likely to strengthen the EU’s potential presence in the Caucasus
overall and in Azerbaijan in particular. This possibility raises an interesting, yet sensitive
question, of whether the EU can afford to play a strategic hand in the region, which Russia
still perceives as its sphere of influence.
So far, the EU holds a neutral stance in this troubled region. Most probably, Brussels
wants at all costs to avoid a direct conflict with Moscow, even if there are serious disagree-
ments in the EU–Russian relations. Despite growing European interest in Caspian energy
sources and pipeline projects, the EU has not yet played any particularly prominent role in
Azerbaijan. Surely the EU needs to become more consistent in its deployment of political
tools and more connected to the activities of the EU member states in the region. If the EU
managed to seize the full range of political opportunities open to it – ranging from diplo-
matic efforts to regional programmes and the provision of more active support in resolving
conflicts – such actions would go a long way towards fostering stability and encouraging
development in Azerbaijan and throughout the region. In the context of the ENP, the EU
should endeavour in various ways to engender long-term stability by implementing transna-
tional economic projects and actively supporting far-reaching reforms designed to promote
the rule of law, combat corruption and organized crime, and develop the free-market econ-
omy in Azerbaijan. To this end, it is important that the EU supports constructive forces, both
within the opposition and the government, mainly counting on politicians who are
adequately prepared to cooperate to reform their country and ensure its full integration into
the European community in the long run.
Conclusion
Since the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in January 2007, the South Caucasus
has become a region of direct concern to the EU’s strategy in its wider neighbourhood, with
the future of the area affecting the interests of EU member states in the south-eastern
perimeter. Instability in this increasingly strategic region presents a number of challenges
characteristic of the post-9/11 geopolitical situation. Against this background are specific
issues related to the young countries’ political behaviour in the context of the US-led war
against terror, the threat of renewed hostilities in conflict areas, the difficult processes of
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democratization in fragile societies, the security of oil and gas pipelines, risks of further envi-
ronmental degradation and humanitarian crises. Nevertheless, the EU seems to adopt a rather
sceptical wait-and-see approach towards the region. The CFSP, albeit still in its early stages,
has provided little political support for the leaders of these post-Soviet states to address
immediate national security concerns linked to separatist regions.
Presumably, the EU acts tactically, not strategically, in the South Caucasus. Notwith-
standing the fact that EU member states such as the UK, France, Germany and Italy are
engaged in South Caucasus at a high level, none of them is able independently to exert
substantial influence in the region. The fact that key member states pursue their own national
foreign policies towards the three Caucasian countries affects the coherence of the EU’s exter-
nal actions. If these European countries were to act in concert, the EU could become a major
player in the South Caucasus – even the most influential one in the middle to long term. But
the incapability and reluctance of the European powers to shape a common and articulated
policy towards the South Caucasus has prevented them from fulfilling their potential.
As a pivotal country in the region, Azerbaijan is a plausible location from which to influ-
ence economic and political trends not only in Central Asia and the Caspian basin but also
in the Middle East, where Western democracies are in a serious quandary over Iran’s
nuclear programme. With respect to energy and trade, the country’s oil and gas fields further
reinforce the importance of the Transport Corridor Europe–Caucasus–Asia (TRACECA)
route, designed to bypass the Russian Federation by crossing Georgian territory. Invest-
ments by major European energy companies and the growing presence of some EU member
states demonstrate that Azerbaijan is seen today as a reliable partner with which the EU is
trying to cultivate trade. Yet in the three main areas in which Azerbaijan affects Europe’s
interests – energy, conflict resolution and democratization – so far the EU has engaged well
on a regional energy strategy, but less so on democratic reforms and almost not at all on
conflict settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. The EU needs to balance its involvement in all
three areas, especially given the deeper democratic changes it wishes to see in Azerbaijan.
Alongside democratic institutions such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (PACE), the EU could assert a more vigorous role in fostering good governance,
democratization and enduring peace through the mandate of the EU Special Representative
and the newly adopted ENP Action Plan. For this to occur, the EU needs a fresh, compre-
hensive strategy, to advance its political, security and economic interests in this rapidly
developing region: a strategy that will aim at asserting a more active EU role and enhancing
EU political standing in the South Caucasus, as well as taking practical steps to contribute
to conflict resolution and encourage wider public dialogue in the three countries, and formu-
lating an EU–Russia–US response to regional security challenges.
Notes
1. This is an updated version of the research work that was conducted in late 2006 in Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik/German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin. For a
more comprehensive analysis of this study, see Elkhan 2007a.
2. In fact, the consequences of transnational crime in the South Caucasus, which is a natural
conduit for trafficking, smuggling and the drug trade, affect both the region and Europe. In
recent years, Azerbaijani and Georgian officials have expressed concerns over the use of sepa-
ratist areas in the drug trade and other kinds of transnational crime. On this issue, see the
Zerkalo newspaper, 20 July 2002; and the BBC Monitoring Global Newsline FSU Political File,
9 February 2002.
3. See RFE/RL Newsline, 26 July 2001. Also see Tchantouridze 2008.
4. See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, 22 January 2008.
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5. Derived from personal communication with Richard Pegge from British Petroleum (Baky,
27 June 2007).
6. Azerbaijan Press Agency (APA) (Baky, 9 January 2008).
7. For more details on this issue, see ‘Putin Deal Torpedoes Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Plans’ in
the European weekly, New Europe (Belgium, 17 May 2007).
8. While, de jure, a part of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh is claimed by Armenia. The territory is
largely populated by Armenians who themselves proclaimed a self-styled ‘independent’ republic
in 1991, which did not receive international recognition. In the early 1990s, Armenian troops took
control of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as seven predominately Azeri-populated districts on its
perimeter. So far, these lands have remained occupied by Armenian forces.
9. An orientation towards political democracy in Azerbaijan was evident during the period 1918–
1920, following establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) on 28 May 1918.
The ADR was recognized by the League of Nations and had a wide spectrum of democratic free-
doms, political pluralism and multiparty structures of power. The ADR was also first among
Muslim states to use the Latin alphabet instead of Arabic script. The democratic development of
Azerbaijani society was forcibly disrupted on 28 April 1920, when Russia’s 11th Red Army
invaded Azerbaijan and the Bolsheviks overthrew the democratic administration. For details, see
Balayev 1991, 1998; Swietochowski 1985.
10. For an interesting overview on this issue, see Mehdiyev 2008.
11. See APA, 18 January 2007.
12. See Azertag, Azerbaijan’s state-owned news agency, 8 November 2006; see also RFR/RL
Newsline, 7 November 2006.
13. Derived from an interview with Mr Solana by Trend, 13 November 2006; see also Zerkalo,
13 November 2006.
14. See Trend, 25 March 2006.
15. See de Waal, T. ‘EU Could Assume Peacekeeping Role.’ IWPR Caucasus Report Service, CRS
341, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, London, 25 May 2006.
16. In fact, the European Commission’s recommendation was based on the Commission’s country
report, which provided a detailed assessment of the EU–Azerbaijani relationship. See European
Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy: Azerbaijan’ Press Release IP/05/238, European
Commission (Brussels, 2 March 2005).
17. See Trend, 14 November 2006.
18. For a comprehensive analysis on this issue, see Nuriyev 2007c.
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